

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 05853 071951Z  
ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 SSM-03 ARA-06 IO-13  
ACDA-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06  
/105 W

-----072010Z 107380 /45 46

R 061521Z APR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3655  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBZSSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASYS KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 5853

(C O R R E C T E D COPY - INFO ADDRESSEE ADDED)

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, EG, US, LU, SU, XA  
SUBJECT: SOVIET/CUBAN AFRICAN OFFENSIVE

REF: CAIRO 5704 (NOTAL)

1. DURING DISCUSSION WITH POLCOUNS APRIL 6, DIRECTOR MFA AFRICAN  
DEPARTMENT AHMAD SIDQI REITERATED GOE CONCERN OVER  
CUBAN/SOVIET OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA AND WHAT "GROWING NUMBER  
OF AFRICAN STATES" PERCIEVE AS WESTERN "PASSIVITY." SIDQI  
FOUND CASTRO VISIT TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER AFRICAN TOUR  
PARTICULARLY "FLAGRANT DEFIANCE" OF WEST AND AFRICANS.  
SIDQI CLAIMED THAT SOME AFRICAN LEADERS ARE SAYING IF KISSINGER  
WERE STILL IN OFFICE, US WOULD HAVE TAKEN SOME COUNTER-ACTIONS  
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PAGE 02 CAIRO 05853 071951Z

BY NOW. SIDQI GAVE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES FOR HIS PESSIMISM:

2. ZAIRE. ZAIRE ARMY DOING VERY BADLY AND NO FRIENDLY  
COUNTRY LIKELY TO HELP OUT WITH TROOPS WHEN MOBUTU  
NOT USING HIS OWN BEST TROOPS. MOBUTU THINKING OF USING  
MERCENARIES, WHICH PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT WOULD CAUSE  
REAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR HIM AMONG AFRICAN STATES. WHILE

GOE HAS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN SHABA INVASION, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR SEVERAL THOUSAND TROOPS OVER PERIOD OF MONTH CONVINCES GOE THAT CUBANS BEHIND INVASION. GOE UNDERSTAND THAT NIGERIAN FONMIN GABRA WAS NOT AT ALL WELL RECEIVED IN LUANDA. ANGOLANS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR MEDIATION SINCE IT WAS STRICTLY ZAIRIAN INTERNAL MATTER. VISITING OAU SECGEN ETAKI HAD TOLD GOE APRIL 5 THAT ON BASIS HIS CRENT VISIT TO ZAIRE HE "VERY CONCERNED" ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF INVASION NOT ONLY FOR ZAIRE BUT SURROUNDING COUNTRIES. SIDQI EMPHASIZED THAT GOE CONVINCED CUBAN/SOVIET AIM IN ZAIRE IS NOT SEPARATION OF SHABA PROVINCE BUT OVERTHROW OF MOBUTU. HE OPINED THAT WHILE DOMINO THEORY HAD NOT PROVED ACCURATE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IT MAY WELL BE SO IN AFRICA.

3. CONGO BRAZZAVILLE. SIDQI SAID GOE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT NGOUABI WAS KILLED BECAUSE OF HIS INTENT TO MAKE SMALL OPENING TO WEST AND THAT NEW PRESIDENT WAS ONLY FRONT MAN FOR REAL POWERS; MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY, BOTH OF WHOM VERY CLOSE TO SOVIETS.

5. GABON AND CAMEROON. GOE INFORMATION IS THAT BOTH OF THESE GOVERNMENTS ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR FUTURE.

5. ZAMBIA. UP UNTIL NOW, KAUNDA HAD BEEN MOST DETERMINED OF "FRONT LINE" LEADERS TO RESIST EXPANSION OF CUBAN/SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT HE WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO RESIST THE TIDE. INVASION OF SHABA IS DIRECT THREAT  
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PAGE 03 CAIRO 05853 071951Z

TO HIM AND CLOSENESS OF SOVIET/CUBAN TIES TO OTHER FRONT LINE STATES WILL BE FELT IN ZAMBIA.  
MATTHEWS

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NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERVENTION, POLITICAL STABILITY, SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, POLITICAL SITUATION, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
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**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
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**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
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**Office:** ACTION AF  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 2  
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**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 77 CAIRO 5704  
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**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
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**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SOVIET/CUBAN AFRICAN OFFENSIVE  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PINS, MOPS, EG, US, CU, UR, XA, LU, SU  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
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